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I. Moot Court: Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
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Fisher v. University of Texas at Alistin 
11-345 
Ruling Below: Fisher v. University of Texas at A1fstin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, 132 S.Ct. 1536 (2012). 
Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz, both Texas residents, were denied undergraduate 
admission to the University of Texas at Austin for the class entering in Fall 2008. They filed this 
suit alleging that UT's admissions policies discriminated against them on the basis of race in 
violation of their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil 
rights statutes. They sought damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. Proceeding with 
separate phases of liability and remedy, the district court found no liability and granted summary 
judgment to the University. Applicants appealed. 
Question Presented: Whether the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v. Bollinger, permit the University of 
Texas at Austin's use of race in undergraduate admissions decisions. 
Abigail Noel FISHER; Rachel Multer Michalewicz, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN; David B. Pryor, Executive Vice Chancellor for 
Academic Affairs in His Official Capacity; William Powers, Jr., President of the University 
of Texas at Austin in His Official Capacity; Board of Regents of the University of Texas 
System; R. Steven Hicks, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; 
William Eugene Powell, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; 
James R. Huffines, as Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; Janiece 
Longoria, as Member of the Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; Colleen McHugh, 
as Member of the Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; Robert L. Stillwell, as 
Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; James D. Dannenbaum, as 
Member of the Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; Paul Foster, as Member of the 
Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; Printice L. Gary, as Member of the Board of 
Regents in His Official Capacity; Kedra Ishop, Vice Provost and Director of 
Undergraduate Admissions in Her Official Capacity; Francisco G. Cigarroa, M.D., Interim 
Chancellor of the University of Texas System in His Official Capacity, Defendants-
Appellees. 
United States Comt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
Decided January 18,2011 
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge 
We consider a challenge to the use of race in undergraduate admissions at the University 
2 
of Texas at Austin. While the University has 
confined its explicit use of race to the 
elements of a program approved by the 
Supreme Court in Grzttter v. Bollinger, UT's 
program acts upon a university applicant 
pool shaped by a legislatively-mandated 
parallel diversity initiative that guarantees 
admission to Texas students in the top ten 
percent of their high school class. The ever-
increasing number of minorities gaining 
admission under this Top Ten Percent Law 
casts a shadow on the horizon to the 
otherwise-plain legality of the Grzttter-like 
admissions program, the Law's own legal 
footing aside. While the Law's ultimate fate 
is not the fare of this suit, the challenge to 
the Grzttfer plan here rests upon the intimate 
ties and ultimate confluence of the two 
mItIatIves. Today we affirm the 
constitutionality of the University's program 
as it existed when Appellants applied and 
were denied admission. 
Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz, 
both Texas residents, were denied 
undergraduate admission to the University 
of Texas at Austin for the class entering in 
Fall 2008. They filed this suit alleging that 
UT's admissions policies discriminated 
against them on the basis of race in violation 
of their right to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil 
rights statutes. They sought damages as well 
as Injunctive and declaratory relief. 
Proceeding with separate phases of liability 
and remedy, the district court, in a 
thoughtful opinion, found no liability and 
granted summary judgment to the 
University. 
I. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER 
A. 
Grzttter embraced the diversity interest 
atiiculated twenty-five years earlier by 
Justice Powell, who wrote separately in 
Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke. This vision of diversity encompassed 
a broad array of qualifications and 
characteristics where race was a single but 
impoliant element. The Michigan Law 
School designed its admissions program to 
achieve this broad diversity, selecting 
students with varied backgrounds and 
experiences-including varied racial 
backgrounds-who would respect and learn 
from one another. The Court explained: 
[The Law School's] policy makes clear there 
are many possible bases for diversity 
admissions, and provides examples of 
admittees who have lived or traveled widely 
abroad, are fluent in several languages, have 
overcome personal adversity and family 
hardship, have exceptional records of 
extensive community service, and have had 
successful careers in other fields. 
The Law School's policy also reaffirmed its 
"longstanding commitment" to "one 
particular type of diversity, that is, racial and 
ethnic diversity with special reference to the 
inclusion of students from groups which 
have been historically discriminated against, 
like African-Americans, Hispanics and 
Native Americans, who without this 
commitment might not be represented in 
[the] student body in meaningful numbers." 
In an effort to ensure representation of 
minorities, the Law School sought to enroll 
a "critical mass" of minority students, which 
would result in increased minority 
engagement in the classroom and enhanced 
minority contributions to the character of the 
School. The Grutter Court endorsed this 
goal, holding that diversity, including 
seeking a critical mass of minority students, 
is "a compelling state interest that can 




Recognizing the pursuit of diversity, 
including racial diversity, to be a compelling 
interest in higher education, Grutter 
endorsed the right of public universities to 
increase enrollment of underrepresented 
minorities. Grutter also cautioned that, 
while it accepted diversity as a compelling 
interest, any sorting of persons on the basis 
of race must be by measures narrowly 
tailored to the interest at stake. 
As we read the Court, a university 
admissions program is nalTowly tailored 
only if it allows for individualized 
consideration of applicants of all races. Such 
consideration does not define an applicant 
by race but instead ensures that she is valued 
for all her unique attributes. Rather than 
applying fixed stereotypes of ways that race 
affects students' lives, an admissions policy 
must be "'flexible enough to consider all 
peliinent elements of diversity in light of the 
particular qualifications of each applicant. '" 
As the Supreme Court later summarized, 
"The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter 
was that the admissions program at issue 
there focused on each applicant as an 
individual, and not simply as a member of a 
particular racial group." Thus, a university 
admissions policy is more likely to be 
narrowly tailored if it contemplates that a 
broad range of qualities and experiences 
beyond race will be impOliant contributions 
to diversity and as such are appropriately 
considered in admissions decisions. 
Both Bakke and Gratz finnly rejected group 
treatment, insisting that the focus be upon 
individuals and that an applicant's 
achievements be judged in the context of 
one's personal circumstances, of which race 
is only a part. So deployed, a white applicant 
raised by a single parent who did not attend 
high school and struggled paycheck to 
paycheck and a minority child of a 
successful cardiovascular surgeon may both 
claim adversity, but the personal hurdles 
each has cleared will not be seen to be of the 
same height. 
C. 
Finally, Grutter reqmres that any race-
conscious measures must have a "logical 
end point" and be "limited in time." This 
durational requirement can be satisfied by 
sunset provisions or by periodic reviews to 
reconsider whether there are feasible race-
neutral alternatives that would achieve 
diversity interests "'about as well. ,,, In this 
respect, Grutter is best seen not as an 
unqualified endorsement of racial 
preferences, but as a transient response to 
anemic academic diversity. As Justice 
O'Connor observed, "We expect that 25 
years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today." 
II. THE CHALLENGED POLICY 
A. 
UT is a public institution of higher 
education, authorized by the Texas 
Constitution and supported by state and 
federal funding. Accordingly, it begins its 
admissions process by dividing applicants 
into three pools: (1) Texas residents, (2) 
domestic non-Texas residents, and (3) 
international students. Students compete for 
admission only against other students in 
their respective pool. Texas residents are 
allotted 90% of all available seats, with 
admission based on a two-tiered system, 
beginning with students automatically 
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law 
and then filling the remaining seats on the 
basis of the Academic and Personal 
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Achievement Indices. Because Appellants 
are Texas residents, their challenge focuses 
on the admissions procedures applied to in-
state applicants. 
Texas applicants are divided into two 
subgroups: (l) Texas residents who are in 
the top ten percent of their high school class 
and (2) those Texas residents who are not. 
Top ten percent applicants are guaranteed 
admission to the University, and the vast 
majority of freshmen are selected in this 
way, without a confessed consideration of 
race. 
The remaining Texas applicants, who were 
not within the top ten percent of their high 
school graduating class, compete for 
admission based on their Academic and 
Personal Achievement Indices. The 
Academic Index is the mechanical formula 
that predicts freshman OPA using 
standardized test scores and high school 
class rank. Some applicants' AI scores are 
high enough that they receive admission 
based on that score alone. Others are low 
enough that their applications are considered 
presumptively denied. 
The Personal Achievement Index is based 
on three scores: one score for each of the 
two required essays and a third score, called 
the personal achievement score, which 
represents an evaluation of the applicant's 
entire file. The essays are each given a score 
between 1 and 6 through "a holistic 
evaluation of the essay as a piece of writing 
based on its complexity of thought, 
substantiality of development, and facility 
with language." 
None of the elements of the personal 
achievement score-including race-are 
considered individually or given separate 
numerical values to be added together. 
Rather, the file is evaluated as a whole in 
order to provide the fullest possible 
understanding of the student as a person and 
to place his or her achievements in context. 
Race is considered as part of the applicant's 
context whether or not the applicant belongs 
to a minority group, and so-at least in 
theory-it "can positively impact applicants 
of all races, including Caucasian[s], or [it] 
may have no impact whatsoever." 
Moreover, given the mechanics of UT's 
admissions process, race has the potential to 
influence only a small part of the applicant's 
overall admissions score. The sole instance 
when race is considered is as one element of 
the personal achievement score, which itself 
is only a part of the total PAL 
B. 
Although the process for calculating AI and 
P AI scores is common to all parts of the 
University, each offer of admission to UT is 
ultimately tied to an individual school or 
major. Texas residents in the top ten percent 
of their high school class are guaranteed 
admission to the University, but they are not 
assured admission to the individual school 
or program of their choice. 
Top Ten Percent Law applicants who do not 
receive automatic entry to their first choice 
program compete for admission to the 
remaining spaces, and if necessary to their 
second-choice program, on the basis of their 
AI and PAl scores. The admissions office 
places students into matrices for each 
preferred school or major, with students 
grouped by AI score along one axis and PAl 
score along the other axis. Liaisons for the 
majors then establish a cutoff line, which is 
drawn in a stair-step pattern. Applicants 
denied admission to their first-choice 
program are considered for their second 
choice, with cutoff lines readjusted to reflect 
the influx of those applicants. Any top ten 
percent applicants not admitted to either 
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their first- or second-choice program are 
automatically admitted as Liberal Arts 
Undeclared majors. All other applicants not 
yet admitted to UT compete, again 
according to AI and PAl scores, for any 
remaInIng seats in the Liberal Arts 
Undeclared program. 
c. 
The Academic Index and Personal 
Achievement Index now employed by UT 
have been in continuous use since 1997. The 
lone substantive change came in 2005, 
following the Grutter decision, when the 
Board of Regents authorized the 
consideration of race as another "special 
circumstance" in assessing an applicant's 
personal achievement score. 
Race-like all other elements of UT's 
holistic review-is not considered alone. 
Admissions officers reVieWIng each 
application are aware of the applicant's race, 
but UT does not monitor the aggregate racial 
composition of the admitted applicant pool 
during the process. The admissions decision 
for any particular applicant is not affected-
positively or negatively-by the number of 
other students in her racial group who have 
been admitted during that year. 
D. 
The district court found that both the UT and 
Grutter policies "attempt to promote 'cross-
racial understanding, ' 'break down racial 
stereotypes,' enable students to better 
understand persons of other races, better 
prepare students to function in a multi-
cultural workforce, cultivate the next set of 
national leaders, and prevent minority 
students from serving as 'spokespersons' for 
their race." Like the law school in Grutter, 
UT "has determined, based on its experience 
and expertise, that a 'critical mass' of 
underrepresented minorities is necessary to 
further its compelling interest in securing the 
educational benefits of a diverse student 
body." 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. 
Judicial deference to a university'S academic 
decisions rests on two independent 
foundations. First, these decisions are a 
product of "complex educational jUdgments 
in an area that lies primarily within the 
expertise of the university," far outside the 
experience of the courts. Second, 
"universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition," with educational 
autonomy grounded in the First 
Amendment. As Justice Powell explained in 
Bakke, "[a]cademic freedom ... includes [a 
university's] selection of its student body." 
Yet the scrutiny triggered by racial 
classification "is no less strict for taking into 
account" the special circumstances of higher 
education. "[S]trict scrutiny is designed to 
provide a framework for carefully 
examining the impOliance and the sincerity 
of the reasons advanced by the 
governmental decisionmaker for the use of 
race in [a] particular context." Narrow 
tailoring, a component of strict scrutiny, 
requires any use of racial classifications to 
so closely fit a compelling goal as to remove 
the possibility that the motive for the 
classification was illegitimate racial 
stereotype. Rather than second-guess the 
merits of the University'S decision, a task 
we are ill-equipped to perform, we instead 
scrutinize the University'S decisionmaking 
process to ensure that its decision to adopt a 
race-conscious admissions policy followed 
from the good faith consideration Grutter 
requires. We presume the University acted 
in good faith, a presumption Appellants are 
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free to rebut. Relatedly, while we focus on 
the University's decision to adopt a GYlItter-
like plan, admissions outcomes remain 
relevant evidence of the plan's necessity-a 
reality check. 
B. 
With a nod to GYlItfer's command that we 
generally give a degree of deference to a 
university's educational judgments, 
Appellants urge that Grutter did not extend 
such deference to a university's decision to 
implement a race-conscious admissions 
policy. Instead, they maintain Gruffer 
deferred only to the university's judgment 
that diversity would have educational 
benefits, not to the assessment of whether 
the university has attained critical mass of a 
racial group or whether race-conscious 
effOlis are necessary to achieve that end. 
As an initial matter, this argument in its full 
flower is contradicted by GYlItter. The 
majority held that, like the examination into 
whether the University has a compelling 
interest, "the narrow-tailoring inquiry . . . 
must be calibrated to fit the distinct issues 
raised by the use of race to achieve student 
body diversity in public higher education." 
That is, the narrow-tailoring inquiry-like 
the compelling-interest inquiry-is 
undertaken with a degree of deference to the 
University's constitutionally protected, 
presumably expert academic judgment. 
Parents Involved in Comm1fnity Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 further 
supports this understanding. The Parents 
Involved COUli never suggested that the 
school districts would be required to prove 
their plans were meticulously supported by 
some patiicular quantum of specific 
evidence. Rather, the COUli struck down the 
school districts' programs because they 
pursued racial balancing and defined 
students based on racial group 
classifications, not on individual 
circumstances. 
In short, the Court has not retreated from 
Gnttter's mode of analysis, one tailored to 
holistic university admissions programs. 
Thus, we apply strict scrutiny to race-
conSCIOUS admissions policies in higher 
education, mindful of a university'S 
academic freedom and the complex 
educational judgments made when 
assembling a broadly diverse student body. 
c. 
Appellants do not allege that UI's race-
conscious admissions policy is functionally 
different from, or gives greater consideration 
to race than, the policy upheld in Grutter. 
Rather, Appellants question whether UT 
needs a GYlItter-like policy. As their 
argument goes, the University'S race-
conscious admissions program IS 
unwarranted because (1) UT has gone 
beyond a mere interest in diversity for 
education's sake and instead pursues a racial 
composition that mirrors that of the state of 
Texas as a whole, amounting to an 
unconstitutional attempt to achieve "racial 
balancing"; (2) the University has not given 
adequate consideration to available "race-
neutral" alternatives, particularly percentage 
plans like the Top Ten Percent Law; and (3) 
UI's minority enrollment under the Top Ten 
Percent Law already surpassed critical mass, 
such that the additional (and allegedly 
"minimal") increase in diversity achieved 
through UI's GYlItter-like policy does not 
justify its use of race-conscious measures. 
We will consider each of these arguments in 
turn. 
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IV. RACIAL BALANCING 
A. 
UT's system was modeled after the Grutter 
program, which the Supreme Court held was 
not a quota. UT has never established a 
specific number, percentage, or range of 
minority enrollment that would constitute 
"critical mass," nor does it award any fixed 
number of points to minority students in a 
way that impermissibly values race for its 
own sake. 
Further, there is no indication that UT's 
Grutter-like plan is a quota by another 
name. It is hue that UT looks in part to the 
number of minority students when 
evaluating whether it has yet achieved a 
critical mass, but "[s]ome attention to 
numbers, without more, does not transform a 
flexible admissions system into a rigid 
quota." Whereas a quota imposes a fixed 
percentage standard that cannot be deviated 
from, a permissible diversity goal 
"'require[s] only a good-faith effort ... to 
come within a range demarcated by the goal 
itself. '" Indeed, UT's policy improves upon 
the program approved in Grutter because the 
University does not keep an ongoing tally of 
the racial composition of the entering class 
during its admissions process. 
B. 
Appellants nevertheless argue that UT's 
program amounts to racial balancing 
because it supposedly evinces a special 
concern or demographically 
underrepresented groups, while neglecting 
the diverse contributions of others. These 
arguments do not account for the operation 
of UT's admissions system or the scope of 
the diversity interest approved by the Court 
in Grutter. 
1. 
The district court expressly found that race 
can enhance the personal achievement score 
of a student from any racial background, 
including whites and Asian-Americans. 
This possibility is the point of Grutter's 
holistic and individualized assessments, 
which must be "'flexible enough to consider 
all pertinent elements of diversity in light of 
the particular qualifications of each 
applicant. '" Indeed, just as in Gruffer, UT 
applicants of every race may submit 
supplemental information to highlight their 
potential diversity contributions, which 
allows students who are diverse in 
unconventional ways to describe their 
unique attributes. 
The summary judgment record shows that 
demographics are not consulted as part of 
any individual admissions decision, and 
UT's admissions procedures do not treat 
certain racial groups or minontIes 
differently than others when reviewing 
individual applications. Rather, the act of 
considering minority group demographics 
(to which Appellants object) took place only 
when the University first studied whether a 
race-conscious admissions program was 
needed to attain critical mass. Appellants' 
objection therefore must be directed not to 
the design of the program, but rather to 
whether UT's decision to reintroduce race as 
a factor in admissions was made in good 
faith. 
2. 
Appellants contend that UT revealed its true 
motive to be outright racial balancing when 
it referenced state population data to justify 
the adoption of race-conscious admissions 
measures. They insist that if UT were truly 
focused on educational benefits and critical 
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mass, then there should be no reason to 
consult demographic data when determining 
whether UT had sufficient minority 
representation. 
We disagree. The University's policies and 
measured attention to the community it 
serves are consonant with the educational 
goals outlined in Grutter and do not suppOli 
a finding that the University was engaged in 
improper racial balancing during our time 
frame of review. Both Grutter and Bakke 
recognized that "there is of course 'some 
relationship between numbers and achieving 
the benefits to be derived from a diverse 
student body. '" In its policymaking process, 
UT gave appropriate attention to those 
educational benefits identified in Grutter 
without overstepping any constitutional 
bounds. 
Grutter's structure accepts that a 
university's twin objectives of rewarding 
academic merit and fostering diversity can 
be complementary rather than competing 
goals; that students rising to the top of 
underrepresented groups demonstrate 
promise as future leaders. These students' 
relative success in the face of harmful and 
widespread stereotypes evidences a degree 
of drive, determination, and merit not 
captured by test scores alone. Insofar as 
Appellants complain that the University's 
limited attention to demographics was 
inconsistent with the legitimate educational 
concerns recognized in Bakke and Grutter, 
we conclude that their contention cannot be 
sustained. 
3. 
Appellants argue that a broad approach to 
educational diversity is improper because 
"critical mass" must be an "inward-facing 
concept ... that focuses on the functioning 
of the student body," encompassing only 
that level of minority enrollment necessary 
to ensure that minority students participate 
in the classroom and do not feel isolated. 
While Appellants' view may comport with 
one literal interpretation of the "critical 
mass" label, it is not the view that prevailed 
in Grutter. The Grutter majority defined 
critical mass "by reference to the 
educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce," and the educational 
benefits recognized in Grutter go beyond the 
narrow "pedagogical concept" urged by 
Appellants. On this understanding, there is 
no reason to assume that critical mass will or 
should be the same for every racial group or 
every university. We are persuaded, as was 
the district court, that the University adhered 
to Grutter when it reintroduced race into its 
admissions process based in part on an 
analysis that devoted special attention to 
those minorities which were most 
significantly underrepresented on its 
campus. 
V. THE TOP TEN PERCENT LAW 
The parties devote significant attention to 
the Top Ten Percent Law. Since the Law 
was first enacted in 1997, UT has seen 
increases in both African-American and 
Hispanic enrollment, but again, changing 
demographics and other minority outreach 
programs render it difficult to quantify the 
increases attributable to the Top Ten Percent 
Law. 
Appellants put forward the Top Ten Percent 
Law as a facially race-neutral alternative 
that would allow UT to obtain a critical 
mass of minority enrollment without 
resorting to race-conscious admissions. As 
the argument goes, if the Top Ten Percent 
Law were able to serve the University's 
interests "about as well" as race-conscious 
admissions, without differentiating between 
students on the basis of race, then it would 
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render UT's current admissions program 
unconstitutional. UT responds that the Top 
Ten Percent Law does not constitute a 
workable alternative to a flexible admissions 
system, and so it is "entirely irrelevant" as a 
matter of law in determining whether or not 
a university may adopt the holistic 
consideration of race to achieve critical 
mass. 
UT is correct that so-called "percentage 
plans" are not a constitutionally mandated 
replacement for race-conscious admissions 
programs under Gmtter, although-as will 
become apparent-this realization alone 
does not end our constitutional inquiry. The 
idea of percentage plans as a viable 
alternative to race-conscious admissions 
policies was directly advocated to the 
Gmtter Court by the United States, arguing 
as amic1Is curiae. In response, the Court 
held that although percentage plans may be 
a race-neutral means of increasing minority 
enrollment, they are not a workable 
alternative-at least in a constitutionally 
significant sense-because "they may 
preclude the university from conducting the 
individualized assessments necessary to 
assemble a student body that is not just 
racially diverse, but diverse along all the 
qualities valued by the university." In 
addition, the Com1 emphasized existing 
percentage plans-including UT's-are 
simply not "capable of producing a critical 
mass without forcing [universities] to 
abandon the academic selectivity that is the 
cornerstone of [their] educational mission." 
VI. CRITICAL MASS 
Appellants contend that UT's decision to 
reintroduce race-conscious admissions was 
unconstitutional because minority 
enrollment already met or exceeded "critical 
mass" when this decision was made, and 
thus any further facial consideration of race 
was neither warranted nor constitutional. 
Appellants claim the best measure of 
whether UT had attained the benefits of 
diversity is the raw percentage minorities 
enrolled. As a result of the combined effects 
of changing demographics, targeted high 
school programs, and the Top Ten Percent 
Law, total minority enrollment had 
increased over the years. When the decision 
was made to reintroduce race-conscious 
admissions in 2004, underrepresented 
minorities made up 21.4% of the incoming 
class. 
Although Texas was not constitutionally 
required to enact the Top Ten Percent Law, 
Appellants are correct that the decision to do 
so-and the substantial effect on aggregate 
minority enrollment at the University-
places at risk UT's race-conscious 
admissions policies. We are confident, and 
hold, that a Gmtter-style admissions system 
standing alone is constitutional. That said, 
whether to overlay such a plan with the Top 
Ten Percent Law and how to calibrate its 
flow presents a Hobson's choice between 
the minority students it contributes and the 
test of constitutional bounds it courts. True 
enough, the Top Ten Percent Law is in a 
sense, perhaps a controlling sense, a 
"facially" race-neutral plan. But it was 
animated by effo11s to increase minority 
enrollment, and to the extent it succeeds it is 
because at key points it proxies for race. 
A. 
Appellants propose various baseline levels 
of diversity which, they suggest, would fully 
satisfy the University's interest in attaining 
critical mass. They first argue that if "from 
13.5 to 20.1 percent" minority enrollment 
was adjudged to be great enough diversity 
each year by Michigan's Law School in 
Gmtter, then the 21.4% minority enrollment 
that UT had achieved prior to reintroducing 
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race-conscious admissions must already 
have achieved critical mass. We find this 
comparison inapt for numerous reasons. 
Appellants' comparison presumes that 
critical mass must have some fixed upper 
bound that applies across different schools, 
different degrees, different states, different 
years, different class sizes, and different 
racial and ethnic subcomposition. It is based 
on Appellants' continued insistence that the 
concept of critical mass is defined by the 
minimum threshold for minority students to 
have their ideas represented in class 
discussions and not to feel isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race. As we have 
discussed, Gruffer firmly rejects that 
premise and defines critical mass by 
reference to a broader view of diversity. 
Appellants point to the Supreme Court's 
observation in United States v. Virginia that 
the Virginia Military Institute "could 
achieve at least 10% female enrollment-a 
sufficient critical mass to provide the female 
cadets with a positive educational 
experience." But this figure, even if 
accurate, covers only one component of the 
multi-faceted concept of diversity elaborated 
in Gruffer. In any event, the claim that 10% 
minority enrollment is a ceiling to critical 
mass is confounded by Grutter. 
Appellants lastly note that minority 
enrollment at UT now exceeds the level it 
had reached in the mid-1990s, pre-
Hopwood, when the University was free to 
obtain any critical mass it wanted through 
overtly race-based decisions. UT responds 
that it has consistently maintained, both in 
the 2004 Proposal and before this Court, 
that even before Hopwood it had never 
reached critical mass. While UT was making 
a greater use of race in that era, its pursuit of 
diversity was constrained by other interests, 
such as admitting only well-qualified 
students. We cannot assume that diversity 
levels immediately before Hopwood were 
indicative of critical mass. Moreover, 
minority enrollment in 1996 is not indicative 
of UT's true pre-Hopwood diversity. While 
admissions decisions in 1996 were not 
controlled by Hopwood, the case impacted 
enrollment, resulting in fewer minority 
students. If one instead compares minority 
enrollment from 1989 to 2004, a different 
picture emerges. In 2004, UT enrolled 
significantly fewer African-Americans than 
it had in 1989 (309 compared to 380). The 
decrease in classroom diversity will only 
continue if additional minority 
representation is not achieved, as the 
University plans to increase its number of 
course offerings in future years. Finally, 
whatever levels of minority enrollment 
sufficed more than a decade ago may no 
longer constitute critical mass today, given 
the social changes Texas has undergone 
during the intervening years. Appellants' 
proposed baselines are insufficient reason to 
doubt UT's considered, good faith 
conclusion that "the University still has not 
reached a critical mass at the classroom 
level. " 
Grutter pointedly refused to tie the concept 
of "critical mass" to any fixed number. The 
Gmtter Court approved of the University of 
Michigan Law School's goal of attaining 
critical mass even though the school had 
specifically abjured any numerical target. 
The type of broad diversity Grutter 
approved does not lend itself to any fixed 
numerical guideposts. 
B. 
As we have observed, benchmarks aside, 
UT's claim that it has not yet achieved 
critical mass is less convincing when viewed 
against the backdrop of the Top Ten Percent 
Law, which had already driven aggregate 
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minority enrollment up to more than one-
fifth of the University's incoming freshman 
class before less subtle race-conscious 
admissions were reintroduced. 
The chief difficulty with looking to 
aggregate minority enrollment is that it 
lumps together distinct minority groups 
from different backgrounds who may bring 
various uniqlle contributions to the 
University environment. In Parents 
Involved, the Supreme Court specifically 
faulted two school districts for employing 
"only a limited notion of diversity" that 
lumped together very different racial groups. 
One school district classified students 
exclusively as "white" or "nonwhite"; 
another labeled them as "black" or "other." 
This "binary conception of race" runs 
headlong into the central teaching of Gmtter 
and other precedents which instruct that a 
university must give serious and flexible 
consideration to all aspects of diversity. 
On this record, we must conclude that the 
University has acted with appropriate 
sensitivity to these distinctions. Although 
the aggregate number of underrepresented 
minorities may be large, the enrollment 
statistics for individual groups when UT 
decided to reintroduce race as a factor in 
admissions decisions does not indicate 
critical mass was achieved. Further, we 
recognize that some year-to-year fluctuation 
in enrollment numbers is inevitable, so 
statistics from any single year lack probative 
force; the University needs to maintain 
critical mass in years when yield is low just 
as it does when yield is high. 
c. 
Appellants argue that even if UT had not yet 
achieved critical mass under race-neutral 
policies, it had come close enough that the 
reintroduction of race-conscious measures 
was unwarranted. Pointing to the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Parents Involved, 
they argue that the University's use of race 
is unnecessary, and therefore not narrowly 
tailored, because it has only a "minimal 
effect." The district court thought this was 
an attempt "to force UT into an impossible 
catch-22: on the one hand, it is well-
established that to be narrowly tailored the 
means 'must be specifically and narrowly 
framed to accomplish' the compelling 
interest, but on the other hand, according to 
[Appellants], the 'narrowly tailored' plan 
must have more than a minimal effect." 
Parents Involved does not support the cost-
benefit analysis that Appellants seek to 
invoke. Rather, Parents Involved was 
primarily a critique of the school districts' 
"extreme approach" that used binary racial 
categories to classify schoolchildren. The 
Court referred to the "minimal effect" 
sought by this policy as evidence that other, 
more narrowly tailored means would be 
effective to serve the school districts' 
interests. The Court did not hold that a 
Gmtter-like system would be impermissible 
even after race-neutral alternatives have 
been exhausted because the gains are small. 
To the contrary, Justice Kennedy-who 
provided the fifth vote in Parents 
Involved-wrote separately to clarify that "a 
more nuanced, individual evaluation . . . 
informed by Gmtter" would be permissible, 
even for the small gains sought by the 
school districts. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Mindful of the time frame of this case, we 
cannot say that under the circumstances 
before us UT breached its obligation to 
undertake a "serious, good faith 
consideration" before resorting to race-
conscious measures; yet we speak with 
caution. In this dynamic environment, our 
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conclusions should not be taken to mean that 
UT is immune from its obligation to 
recalibrate its dual systems of admissions as 
needed, and we cannot bless the university's 
race-conscious admissions program in 
perpetuity. Rather, much like judicial 
approval of a state's redistricting of voter 
districts, it is good only until the next census 
count-it is more a process than a fixed 
structure that we review. The University'S 
formal and informal review processes will 
confront the stark fact that the Top Ten 
Percent Law, although soon to be restricted 
to 75% of the incoming class, increasingly 
places at risk the use of race in admissions. 
In 1998, those admitted under the Top Ten 
Percent Law accounted for 41 % of the 
Texas residents in the freshman class, while 
in 2008, top ten percent students comprised 
81 % of enrolled Texan freshmen. This 
trajectory evidences a risk of eroding the 
necessity of using race to achieve critical 
mass with accents that may, if persisted in, 
increasingly present as an effoti to meet 
quantitative goals drawn from the 
demographics of race and a defiance of the 
now-demanded focus upon individuals when 
considering race. 
A university may decide to pursue the goal 
of a diverse student body, and it may do so 
to the extent it ties that goal to the 
educational benefits that flow from 
diversity. The admissions procedures that 
UT adopted, modeled after the plan 
approved by the Supreme Court in Gruffer, 
are narrowly tailored-procedures in some 
respects superior to the Grufter plan because 
the University does not keep a running tally 
of underrepresented minority representation 
during the admissions process. We are 
satisfied that the University'S decision to 
reintroduce race-conscious admissions was 
adequately supported by the "serious, good 
faith consideration" required by Grutter. 
Finally, it is neither our role nor purpose to 
dance from Grutter's firm holding that 
diversity is an interest supporting 
compelling necessity. Nor are we inclined to 
do so. The role of black athletes in the 
southern universtttes forty years ago 
presents diversity's potential better than can 
we, although at that early juncture, it was 
ability overcoming a barrier of race. 
The judgment of the district court is 
AFFIRMED. 
KING, Circuit Judge, specially 
concurring: 
I concur in the judgment and in the analysis 
and application of Grutter in Judge 
Higginbotham's opmlOn. No party 
challenged, in the district court or in this 
couti, the validity or the wisdom of the Top 
Ten Percent Law. We have no briefing on 
those subjects, and the district court did not 
consider them. Accordingly, I decline to join 
Judge Higginbotham's opinion insofar as it 
addresses those subjects. 
GARZA, Circuit Judge, specially 
concurring: 
Today, we follow Grutter's lead in finding 
that the University of Texas's race-
conscious admissions program satisfies the 
Couti's unique application of strict scrutiny 
in the university admissions context. I 
concur in the majority opinion, because, 
despite my belief that Gruffer represents a 
digression in the course of constitutional 
law, today's opinion is a faithful, if 
unfortunate, application of that misstep. The 
Supreme Court has chosen this erroneous 
path and only the Couti can rectify the error. 
In the meantime, I write separately to 




The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no 
State shall "deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XlV. One of 
the Amendment's "core principles" is to "do 
away with all governmentally imposed 
discriminations based on race," and to create 
"a Nation of equal citizens in a society 
where race is irrelevant to personal 
oPPOltunity and achievement." This is why 
"[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort 
are inherently suspect and ... call for the 
most exacting judicial examination." 
In Gruffer, the majority acknowledged these 
fundamental principles, but then departed 
and held, for the first time, that racial 
preferences in university admissions could 
be used to serve a compelling state interest. 
Though the Court recognized that strict 
scrutiny should govern the inquiry into the 
use of race in university admissions, what 
the Court applied in practice was something 
else entirely. 
A. 
The Grutter majority asserts that "[ s ]trict 
scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in 
fact. '" But since the Court began applying 
strict scrutiny to review governmental uses 
of race in discriminating between citizens, 
the number of cases in which the Court has 
permitted such uses can be counted on one 
hand. The Court has rejected numerous 
intuitively appealing justifications offered 
for racial discrimination, such as remedying 
general societal discrimination, enhancing 
the number of minority professionals 
available to work in underserved minority 
communities, and providing role models for 
minority students. In all of these cases, the 
Comi found that the policy goals offered 
were insufficiently compelling to justify 
discrimination based on race. 
In those rare cases where the use of race 
properly fmihered a compelling state 
interest, the Court has emphasized that the 
means chosen must "work the least harm 
possible," and be narrowly tailored to fit the 
interest "with greater precision than any 
alternative means." Moreover, the failure to 
consider available race-neutral alternatives 
and employ them if efficacious would cause 
a program to fail strict scrutiny. 
Gruffer changed this. After finding that 
racial diversity at the University of 
Michigan Law School ("Law School") was a 
compelling governmental interest, the Court 
redefined the meaning of narrow tailoring. 
The Couli replaced narrow tailoring's 
conventional "least restrictive means" 
requirement with a regime that encourages 
opacity and is incapable of meaningful 
judicial review under any level of scrutiny. 
Courts now simply assume, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, that university 
administrators have acted in good faith in 
pursuing racial diversity, and courts are 
required to defer to their educational 
judgments on how best to achieve it. What is 
more, the deference called for in Gruffer 
seems to allow universities, rather than the 
courts, to determine when the use of racial 
preferences is no longer compelling. This 
new species of strict scrutiny ensures that 
only those admissions programs employing 
the most heavy-handed racial preferences, 
and those programs foolish enough to 
maintain and provide conclusive data, will 
be subject to "exacting judicial 
examination." Others, like the University of 
Michigan in Gruller, and the University of 




In Grutter, the University of Michigan Law 
School sought to achieve a student body that 
was both academically strong and diverse 
along several dimensions, including race. 
There, the Court endorsed the Law School's 
"highly individualized, holistic review of 
each applicant's file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant 
might contribute to a diverse educational 
environment." The Court noted approvingly 
that the Law School had "no policy ... of 
automatic acceptance or rejection based on 
any single 'soft' variable." The Grutter 
majority permitted the use of race and 
ethnicity as "plus" factors within the Law 
School's holistic review, but this simply 
raises the question: how much of a plus? 
Grutter did not say. 
Instead, the Comi implicitly forbade 
universities from quantifying racial 
preferences in their admissions calculus. 
Contrasting the admissions system found 
unconstitutional in Gratz, the Grutter 
majority noted that "the Law School awards 
no mechanical, predetermined diversity 
'bonuses' based on race or ethnicity." On 
this view, rigid point systems that allocate 
preference points for racial and ethnic status 
are unconstitutional because they "preclude[ 
] admissions counselors from conducting the 
type of individualized consideration the 
Court's opinion in Grutter requires." 
But it is not clear, to me at least, how using 
race in the holistic scoring system approved 
in Grutter is constitutionally distinct from 
the point-based system rejected in Gratz. If 
two applicants, one a preferred minority and 
one nonminority, with application packets 
identical in all respects save race would be 
assigned the same score under a holistic 
scoring system, but one gets a higher score 
when race is factored in, how is that 
different from the mechanical group-based 
boost prohibited in Gratz? Although one 
system quantifies the preference and the 
other does not, the result is the same: a 
determinative benefit based on race. 
Grutter's new terminology like 
"individualized consideration" and "holistic 
review" tends to conceal this result. By 
obscuring the University of Michigan's use 
of race in these diffuse tests, the Court 
allowed the Law School to do covertly what 
the undergraduate program could not do 
overtly. 
c. 
Grutter found that the Law School had a 
compelling interest in "securing the 
educational benefits of a diverse student 
body," and that achieving a "critical mass" 
of racially diverse students was necessary to 
accomplish that goal. The Law School 
defined "critical mass" as "a number that 
encourages underrepresented minority 
students to participate in the classroom and 
not feel isolated ... or like spokespersons 
for their race." The Court clarified: "critical 
mass is defined by reference to the 
educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce." Justice O'Connor's 
majority opinion identified three such 
constitutionally relevant benefits: (i) 
increased perspective in the classroom; (ii) 
improved professional training; and (iii) 
enhanced civic engagement. 
My difficulty with Grutter's "educational 
benefits of diversity" discussion is that it 
remains suspended at the highest levels of 
hypothesis and speculation. And unlike 
ordinary hypotheses, which must be testable 




The first constitutionally relevant benefit 
that makes up Grutter's compelling interest 
is racial diversity's direct impact in the 
classroom. Here, the Court concluded that 
diverse perspectives improve the overall 
quality of education because "classroom 
discussion is livelier, more spirited, and 
simply more enlightening and interesting 
when students have the greatest possible 
variety of backgrounds." 
Assuming a critical mass of minority 
students could perceptibly improve the 
quality of classroom learning, how would 
we measure success? 
My concern with allowing viewpoint 
diversity's alleged benefits to justify racial 
preference is that viewpoint diversity is too 
theoretical and abstract. If all a university 
"need do is find ... report[s]," studies, or 
surveys to implement a race-conscious 
admissions policy, "the constraints of the 
Equal Protection Clause will, in effect, have 
been rendered a nullity. Gruffer permits 
race-based preferences on nothing more than 
intuition-the type that strict scrutiny is 
designed to protect against. 
The Constitution prohibits state 
decisionmakers from presuming that groups 
of individuals, whether classified by race, 
ethnicity, or gender, share such a quality 
collectively. There is no one African-
American or Hispanic viewpoint, and, in 
fact, Grutter approved the Law School's 
diversity rationale precisely because of the 
role that racial diversity can play in 
dispelling such falsehoods. 
Gruffer sought to have it both ways. The 
Court held that racial diversity was 
necessary to eradicate the notion that 
minority students think and behave, not as 
individuals, but as a race. At the same time, 
the Court approved a policy granting race-
based preferences on the assumption that 
racial status correlates with greater diversity 
of viewpoints. 
2. 
Grlltter's second asserted educational 
benefit of diversity relates to improved 
professional training. Such training is 
essential, the argument goes, for future 
leaders who will eventually work within and 
supervise a racially diverse workforce. 
State universities are free to define their 
educational goals as broadly as needed to 
serve the public interest. We defer to 
educators' professional judgments in setting 
those goals. My concern, discussed 
throughout this opinion, is not that Grutter 
commands such deference, but that it 
conflated the deference owed to a 
university'S asserted interest with deference 
to the means used to attain it. 
There is, however, one aspect of the Court's 
"improved professional training" rationale 
that I find especially troubling. While 
Grlltter made much of the role that 
educational institutions play in providing 
professional training, the cases the Comi 
relied on involved primary and secondary 
schools. I question whether these cases 
apply with equal force in the context of 
higher education, where academic goals are 
vastly different from those pursued in 
elementary and secondary schools. 
Moreover, a university'S self-styled 
educational goals, for example, promoting 
"cross-racial understanding" and enabling 
students "to better understand persons of 
different races," could just as easily be 
facilitated in many other public settings 
where diverse people assemble regularly. I 
do not believe that the university has a 
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monopoly on furthering these societal goals, 
or even that the university is in the best 
position to further such goals. 
3. 
Finally, Grutter articulated a third benefit of 
racial diversity in higher education: 
enhancing civic engagement. Here, the 
Court wrote that: 
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is 
necessary that the path to leadership be 
visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All 
members of our heterogeneous society must 
have confidence in the openness and 
integrity of educational institutions that 
provide this training .... Access to [higher] 
education ... must be inclusive of talented 
and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity, so that all members of our 
heterogeneous society may participate in the 
educational institutions that provide the 
training and education necessary to succeed 
in America. 
Unlike the first two "educational benefits of 
diversity," which focused on improving 
classroom discussion and professional 
training, this third claimed benefit plainly 
has nothing to do with the university's core 
education and training functions. Instead, 
Grutter is concerned here with role that 
higher education plays in a democratic 
society, and the Court suggests that 
affirmative action at public universities can 
advance a societal goal of encouraging 
minority participation in civic life. This 
proposition lacks foundation. 
If a significant portion of a minority 
community sees our nation's leaders as 
illegitimate or lacks confidence in the 
integrity of our educational institutions, as 
Grutter posits in the block quote above, I 
doubt that suspending the prevalent 
constitutional rules to allow preferred 
treatment for as few as 15--40 students, is 
likely to foster renewed civic participation 
from among that community as a whole. 
D. 
Finally, by using metaphors, like "critical 
mass," and indefinite terms that lack 
conceptual or analytical precision, but rather 
sound in abject subjectivity, to dress up 
constitutional standards, Grutter fails to 
provide any predictive value to courts and 
university administrators tasked with 
applying these standards consistently. And 
notwithstanding the Court's nod to 
federalism, Grutter's ambiguity discourages 
States from experimenting or depmiing from 
the one accepted norm. In the absence of 
clear guidance, public universities 
nationwide will simply model their 
programs after the one approved in Grutter 
rather than struggle with the risks and 
uncertain benefits of experimentation. That 
is exactly what has occurred here. With one 
exception-the Top Ten Percent law-the 
race-conscious admissions policy that we 
review today is identical to the program 
used at the Law School. 
II. 
As mentioned at the outset, I concur in the 
opinion because I believe today's decision is 
a faithful application of Grutter's teachings, 
however flawed I may find those teachings 
to be. I am compelled to follow the Court's 
unusual deference towards public university 
administrators in their assessment that racial 
diversity is a compelling interest, as well as 
the Court's refashioned narrow-tailoring 
inquiry. My difficulty is not necessarily with 
today's decision, but with the one that drives 
it. Nonetheless, there is one aspect of Judge 
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Higginbotham's thoughtful OpInIOn that 
gives me pause about whether Grutter 
compels the result we reach today. 
Ultimately, and regrettably, I recognize that 
the deference called for by Grutter may 
make this concern superfluous. 
As today's opinion notes, the University of 
Texas's race-conscious admissions policy is 
nearly indistinguishable from the program 
approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter. 
As such, the majority opinion summarily 
finds that, like the Law School in Gruffer, 
the University of Texas has a compelling 
interest in obtaining the educational benefits 
of diversity in its undergraduate program. 
After affording all deference due, today's 
decision focuses on the efficacy of the 
University's race-conscious admissions 
policy. In my view, the efficacy of the 
University's race-based admissions policy is 
more than merely relevant, it is dispositive. 
The controlling question is, "Is the 
University of Texas's race-conscious policy 
effective?" The constitutional inquiry for me 
concerns whether the University's program 
meaningfully furthers its intended goal of 
increasing racial diversity on the road to 
critical mass. I find it does not. 
In the 2008 admissions cycle, 29,501 
students applied to the University of Texas. 
Less than half, 12,843, were admitted and 
6,715 ultimately enrolled. Of these enrolled 
students, 6,322 came from Texas high 
schools. 5,114 (80.9% of enrolled Texas 
residents) of these students were a product 
of Top Ten Percent, meaning that, at most, 
1,208 (19.1%) enrolled non-Top Ten 
Percent Texas residents had been evaluated 
on the basis of their AI/PAl scores. 
Of the 363 African-American freshmen 
from Texas high schools that were admitted 
and enrolled (6% of the 6,322-member 
enrolling class from Texas high schools), 
305 (4.8%) were a product of Top Ten 
Percent, while 58 (0.92%) African-
American enrollees had been evaluated on 
the basis of their AI/PAl scores. For the 
1,322 (21 %) total enrolled in-state Hispanic 
students, 1,164 (18.4% of enrolled in-state 
students) were a product of Top Ten 
Percent, while 158 (2.5%) had been 
evaluated on the basis of their AIIP AI 
scores. We know that in some cases an 
applicants' AI score is high enough that the 
applicant is granted admission based on that 
score alone. But we do not have data to 
show how many of these 58 African-
American and 158 Hispanic students were 
admitted automatically based on their AI 
scores, which are race-neutral, and how 
many were admitted after factoring in the 
students' P AI scores, which use the 
University's Grutter-like holistic evaluation 
plan and include consideration of an 
applicant's race as one of seven "special 
circumstances." Nonetheless, assuming that 
all 58 and 158 African-American and 
Hispanic students, respectively, were 
admitted on the basis of their combined Al 
and PAl scores, the question is whether the 
University's use of race, which is a "highly 
suspect tool," as part of the PAl score 
contributes a statistically significant enough 
number of minority students to affect critical 
mass at the University of Texas. 
We do not know, because the University 
does not maintain data, the degree to which 
race influenced the University's admissions 
decisions for any of these enrolled students 
or how many of these students would not 
have been admitted but-for the use of race as 
a plus factor. But assuming the University 
gave race decisive weight in each of these 
58 African-American and 158 Hispanic 
students' admissions decisions, those 
students would still only constitute 0.92% 
and 2.5%, respectively, of the entire 6,322-
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person enrolling in-state freshman class. 
III. 
The Supreme Court's narrow tailoring 
jurisprudence has been reliably tethered, at 
least before 2003, to the principle that 
whenever the government divides citizens 
by race, which is itself an evil that can only 
be justified in the most compelling 
circumstances, that the means chosen will 
inflict the least harm possible, and fit the 
compelling goal "so closely that there is 
little or no possibility that the motive for the 
classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype." Grutter abandoned 
this principle and substituted in its place an 
amorphous, untestable, and above all, 
hopelessly deferential standard that ensures 
that race-based preferences in university 
admissions will avoid meaningful judicial 
review for the next several decades. 
Government-sponsored discrimination IS 
repugnant to the notion of human equality 
and is more than the Constitution can bear. 
There are no de minimis violations of the 
Equal Protection Clause, and when 
government undertakes any level of race-
based social engineering, the costs are 
enormous. Not only are race-based policies 
inherently divisive, they reinforce 
stereotypes that groups of people, because of 
their race, gender, or ethnicity, think alike or 
have common life experiences. The Court 
has condemned such class-based 
presumptions repeatedly. 
Yesterday's racial discrimination was based 
on racial preference; today's racial 
preference results in racial discrimination. 
Like the plaintiffs and countless other 
college applicants denied admission based, 
in part, on government-sponsored racial 
discrimination, I await the Court's return to 
constitutional first principles. 
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"Justices Take Up Race as a Factor in College Entry" 
The New York Times 
February 21,2012 
Adam Liptak 
In a 2003 decision that the majority said it 
expected would last for 25 years, the 
Supreme COUli allowed public colleges and 
universities to take account of race in 
admission decisions. On Tuesday, the court 
signaled that it might end such affirmative 
action much sooner than that. 
By agreeing to hear a major case involving 
race-conscious admissions at the University 
of Texas, the court thrust affirmative action 
back into the public and political discourse 
after years in which it had mostly faded 
from view. Both supporters and opponents 
of affirmative action said they saw the 
announcement-and the change in the 
court's makeup since 2003-as a signal that 
the court's five more conservative members 
might be prepared to do away with racial 
preferences in higher education. 
The consequences of such a decision would 
be striking. It would, all sides agree, reduce 
the number of African-American and Latino 
students at nearly every selective college 
and graduate school, with more Asian-
American and white students gaining 
entrance instead. 
A decision barring the use of race in 
admission decisions would undo an 
accommodation reached in the Supreme 
COUli's 5-to-4 decision in 2003 in Grutter v. 
Bollinger: that public colleges and 
universities could not use a point system to 
increase minority enrollment but could take 
race into account in vaguer ways to ensure 
academic diversity. 
Supporters of affirmative action reacted with 
alarm to the cOUli's decision to hear the 
case. "I think it's ominous," said Lee 
Bollinger, the president of Columbia 
University, who as president of the 
University of Michigan was a defendant in 
the Grutter case. "It threatens to undo 
several decades of effort within higher 
education to build a more integrated and just 
and educationally enriched environment." 
Opponents saw an opportunity to strike a 
decisive blow on an issue that had partly 
faded from view. "Any form of 
discrimination, whether it's for or against, is 
wrong," said Hans von Spakovsky, a legal 
fellow at the Heritage Foundation, who 
added that his daughter was applying to 
college. "The idea that she might be 
discriminated against and not be admitted 
because of her race is incredible to me." 
Arguments in the new case are likely to be 
heard just before the presidential election in 
November, and they may force the 
candidates to weigh in on a long dormant 
and combustible issue that has divided the 
electorate. There was little immediate 
reaction from the campaign trail and in 
official Washington on Tuesday, which may 
be attributable to the political risks the issue 
presents to both Democrats and 
Republicans. 
Some polls show that a narrow majority of 
Americans support some forms of 
affirmative action, though much depends on 
how the question is framed, and many 
people have at least some reservations. 
The new case, Fishel' v. University of 
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Texas, No. 11-345, was brought by Abigail 
Fisher, a white student who says the 
University of Texas denied her admission 
because of her race. The case has 
idiosyncrasies that may limit its reach, but it 
also has the potential to eliminate diversity 
as a rationale sufficient to justify any use of 
race in admission decisions-the rationale 
the court endorsed in the Grutter decision. 
Diversity, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
wrote, encourages lively classroom 
discussions, fosters cross-racial harmony 
and cultivates leaders seen as legitimate. But 
critics say there is only a weak link between 
racial and academic diversity. 
The Grutter decision allowed but did not 
require states to take account of race in 
admissions. Several states, including 
California and Michigan, forbid the practice, 
and public universities in those states have 
seen a drop in minority admissions. In other 
states and at private institutions, officials 
generally look to race and ethnicity as one 
factor among many, leading to the 
admission of significantly more black and 
Hispanic students than basing the decisions 
strictly on test scores and grades would. 
A Supreme COUl1 decision forbidding the 
use of race in admission at public 
universities would almost ce11ainly mean 
that it would be barred at most private ones 
as well under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which forbids racial 
discrimination in programs that receive 
federal money. In her majority opinion in 
Grutter, Justice O'Connor said the day 
would come when "the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary" in 
admission decisions to foster educational 
diversity. She said she expected that day to 
arrive in 25 years, or in 2028. Tuesday's 
decision to revisit the issue suggests the 
deadline may arrive just a decade after 
Gruffer. 
The court's membership has changed since 
2003, most notably with the appointment of 
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., who replaced 
Justice O'Connor in 2006. Justice Alito has 
voted with the court's more conservative 
justices in decisions hostile to government 
use of racial classification. 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. has been 
particularly skeptical of government 
programs that take account of race. "Racial 
balancing is not transformed from 'patently 
unconstitutional' to a compelling state 
interest simply by relabeling it 'racial 
diversity, '" he wrote in a 2007 decision 
limiting the use of race to achieve 
integration in public school districts. 
Justices Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas agreed. Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy, the court's swing justice, also 
voted to invalidate the programs. But he was 
less categorical, sharply limiting the role 
race could play in children's school 
assignments but stopping short of forbidding 
school districts from ever taking account of 
race. Still, Justice Kennedy has never voted 
to uphold an affirmative action program. 
In Texas, students in the top 10 percent of 
high schools are automatically admitted to 
the public university system, a policy that 
does not consider race but increases racial 
diversity in part because so many high 
schools are racially homogenous. Ms. Fisher 
just missed that cutoff at her high school in 
Sugar Land, Tex., and then entered a 
separate pool of applicants who can be 
admitted through a complicated system in 
which race plays an unquantified but 
significant role. She sued in 2008. 
Ms. Fisher is soon to graduate from 
Louisiana State University. Lawyers for the 
University of Texas said that meant she had 
not suffered an injury that a court decision 
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could address, meaning she does not have 
standing to sue. 
Ms. Fisher's argument is that Texas cannot 
have it both ways. Having implemented a 
race-neutral program to increase minority 
admissions, she says, Texas may not 
supplement it with a race-conscious one. 
Texas officials said the additional effort was 
needed to make sure that individual 
classrooms contained a "critical mass" of 
minority students. 
The lower federal courts ruled for the state. 
Chief Judge Edith Jones of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
dissenting from the full appeals court's 
decision not to rehear Ms. Fisher's case, was 
skeptical of state officials' rationale. "Will 
classroom diversity 'suffer' in areas like 
applied math, kinesiology, chemistry, Farsi 
or hundreds of other subjects if, by chance, 
few or no students of a certain race are 
enrolled?" she asked. 
Justice Elena Kagan disqualified herself 
from hearing the case, presumably because 
she had worked on it as solicitor general. 
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"In Fisher v. Texas, Look at the Politics" 
The New York Times 
February 23,2012 
Ian Haney-Lopez 
We should expect the Supreme Court in 
Fisher v. Texas to declare affirmative action 
unconstitutional. To understand this 
decision, ignore the social reality of 
continued racial inequality. Focus instead on 
electoral politics past and present. 
Starting with Richard Nixon, conservative 
politicians campaigned against the Supreme 
Court, using it as a foil in the culture wars. 
Forced busing, affirmative action, the 
coddling of criminals-these supposed 
offenses were charged to the court, and then 
used to mobilize voters discomfited by 
recent racial progress. Beyond race-baiting, 
other choice phrases included school prayer, 
abortion on demand, and tolerance for the 
homosexual lifestyle. In the 40 years 
preceding Barack Obama's election, 
Republicans elected on these themes held 
the presidency for 28 years-and appointed 
12 of the 14 justices elevated to the court. 
The net result for racial justice can be easily 
summarized. The court stopped seeing in the 
Constitution a source of protection for 
minorities: after 1980, it virtually never 
found mistreatment against nonwhites. 
Instead, conservative justices wielded their 
power against affirmative action. They 
ended efforts to use race to promote 
integration in contracting, employment and 
voting-and, with Fisher, likely higher 
education. 
These dramatic reversals occUlTed in fits and 
starts. After a notable pause, are-energized 
bloc is marching again. Two especially 
devastating developments loom. The court 
seems intent on making federal laws 
banning discrimination as ineffective as 
they've rendered the constitution III 
detecting racial mistreatment; and also 
poised to extend the ban on affirmative 
action to corporations, private hospitals, 
foundations and unions. If these come to 
pass, the court will have curtailed every 
direct means of achieving an integrated 
society. 
Once again, today's presidential campaign 
resounds with themes of gay marriage, 
abortion, contraception and now affirmative 
action-issues guaranteed to inform judicial 
appointments. In 2012, vote as if racial 
justice depends upon it. 
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"The Future of Affirmative Action: Kennedy is the Key" 
Huff Post Politico 
March 6, 2012 
Stephen Menendian 
The United States Supreme Court recently 
agreed to take up the case of Fisher v. 
University of Texas. The case will once 
more put the issue of affirmative action 
squarely into national focus just eight years 
after the Court upheld the use of race in the 
University of Michigan's admissions 
decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger. By a 5-4 
vote, the Court in Grutter upheld the use of 
race in university admissions, but placed 
strict limits on the practice. Now that the 
composition of the Court has changed, 
attention will fall on Justice Kennedy, the 
current Comi's critical swing vote. Since 
recent appointee Justice Kagan has recused 
herself from the case, on account of her 
participation in these cases in her previous 
role as solicitor general, the stakes are 
higher than ever. One way or the other, 
Justice Kennedy will decide the fate of 
affirmative action. His dissenting opinion in 
Grutter is a roadmap to the outcome in 
Fisher. 
The Court in Grutter held that promoting 
racial diversity in institutions of higher 
education is a compelling governmental 
interest that serves to ensure that the 
pathways of opportunity are open to persons 
of all backgrounds and races. This is 
especially true for flagship institutions such 
as the University of Michigan or the 
University of Texas. The Court also 
emphasized the impOliance of diversity for 
these institutions in terms of our broader 
democratic society. The Court reasoned that 
if the training grounds for our nation's 
leaders were not "visibly open to talented 
and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity," then these institutions-and our 
democracy more generally-might lose 
"legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry." In 
addition, the Court underscored the vital 
importance of academic freedom, of giving 
universities the flexibility they need to select 
the student body that will prepare their 
students for academic success. The Court 
explained that creating a diverse student 
body promotes the exchange of diverse 
viewpoints, reduces stereotyping and 
prejudice, and generates cross-racial 
understanding. 
While the Court upheld the University of 
Michigan Law School's admissions 
procedure, the Comi placed strict limits on 
such decision-making to safeguard the 
interests of nonminority students. The Court 
required that any race-conscious admissions 
procedure be "narrowly tailored." The Court 
indicated that a narrowly tailored process 
would include consideration of race-neutral 
alternatives and would apply a 'holistic' 
approach to admissions decision-making, 
ensuring that race is not a decisive factor in 
any given admissions determination. In 
particular, a university may not set a quota 
or pursue a numerical target, but may seek 
to enroll a 'critical mass' of 
underrepresented students. In a companion 
decision, the Court struck down the 
University of Michigan's undergraduate 
admissions procedure for failing to meet the 
requirements of narrow tailoring. 
Ultimately, Grutter was decided by a 5-4 
vote. While Justice O'Connor, writing for 
the majority, held that the University of 
Michigan Law School's admissions plan 
was narrowly tailored, Justice Kennedy 
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remained unconvinced. To explain his 
disagreement, Justice Kennedy authored a 
separate, dissenting, OpInIOn. Justice 
Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Grutter 
provides a clear roadmap for his ruling in 
Fisher. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy 
agreed with Justice O'Connor that the 
proper rule for evaluating affirmative action 
derives from Justice Powell's opinion in the 
1970s Bakke decision, an opinion had not 
enjoyed clear support of a majority of the 
Court until Grutter. In his opinion in Bakke, 
Justice Powell asserted that promoting 
diversity is a compelling government 
interest that would justify the use of race-
conscious admissions. However, such a 
program must be narrowly tailored to 
safeguard the rights of innocent non-
minority students. Therefore, it follows that 
Justice Kennedy, like Justice O'Connor, 
believes that promoting racial diversity is a 
compelling governmental interest, and 
would uphold any affirmative action 
program that is narrowly tailored. However, 
unlike Justice O'Connor, who voted to 
uphold the University of Michigan Law 
School's holistic admissions plan, Justice 
Kennedy did not believe that University of 
Michigan's diversity plan was narrowly 
tailored. In particular, Justice Kennedy cited 
the fact that the narrow fluctuation band of 
minority enrollment over the years 
"subverted individual determination." In 
addition, Justice Kennedy was concerned 
that the undue attention to the 'daily 
reports', which updated university 
admissions administrators on the number of 
minority applications accepted, undermined 
the individualized review throughout the 
entire admissions process. 
Given Justice Kennedy's agreement broad 
agreement with Justice O'Connor that 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is the 
proper rule for reviewing affirmative action 
policies, the Fisher decision will not result in 
the end of affirmative action. It does, 
however, seem likely that the Court in 
Fisher, in a 5-3 decision (since Kagan will 
not have a vote), will strike down the use of 
race in admissions currently employed by 
the University of Texas for failing the 
narrowly tailoring requirement. 
The University of Texas currently reviews 
two pools for its undergraduate programs. 
By law, any student graduating in the top 
10% of their high school class is 
automatically admitted to the University of 
Texas. The top 10% law was passed in the 
last 1990s following a federal case that 
struck down the University's affirmative 
action plan. The 10% ironically relies on 
underlying patterns of de facto segregation 
throughout the state to ensure diversity in 
the University's undergraduate programs. 
The vast majority of the students admitted to 
the University are enrolled through the top 
10% law. The remaining applicants are then 
subject to the holistic race-conscIous 
admissions procedure. 
Ultimately, the Fisher case will more finely 
determine the kinds of restrictions that will 
be imposed on permissible affirmative 
action plans. Although the Petitioner, 
Abigail Fisher, argues that no consideration 
of race should be allowed, the COUli will not 
lay down such a rule. Justice Kennedy, 
writing on behalf of the Court, will not vote 
to prohibit affirmative action, but will likely 
clarify the kinds of narrow tailoring 
requirements that are required to satisfy 
strict scrutiny and safeguard the rights of 
non-minority applicants under the equal 
protection clause. 
The Fisher decision will likely resemble the 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 decisions from 
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2007 in which Justice Kennedy voted to 
strike down the voluntary integration plans 
at issue, but made clear that avoiding the 
harms of racial isolation and promoting 
racial diversity in K-12 education are 
compelling governmental interests, and set 
forth various methods by which it may be 
permissibly achieved. Furthermore, Justice 
Kennedy went out of his way to underscore 
the necessity of such plans for the future of 
our nation, given the endemic inequities in 
our K-12 system. 
Although affirmative action will not be 
eliminated as a result of this case, the 
ultimate resolution is likely to be fact 
intensive. The precise range of minorities 
admitted under the general admissions pool 
will be carefully scrutinized. The success of 
the 10% plan in achieving an increase in 
minority enrollment may well doom the 
chances for arguing that additional race-
conscious mechanisms are necessary to 
achieve a diverse student body. Each of 
these questions and more will be thoroughly 
argued and debated. Should Justice Kennedy 
make it practically impossible to achieve 
meaningful diversity using affirmative 
action, creative race-neutral alternatives 
designed to promote diversity in higher 
education, such as the 10% plan, more 
intensive recruitment of minority students to 
boost applicant pools, or examination of 
race proxies such growing up in 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty, will 
likely become the focus of future efforts 
promote diversity in higher education. 
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The Obama administration urged the U.S. 
Supreme Court to reaffirm the legality of 
race-based college admissions, as the 
justices prepare to review the affirmative 
action programs that have become fixtures at 
the nation's top universities [in Fisher v. 
University of Texas]. 
The high court will hear arguments Oct. 10 
on a white woman's contention that she 
suffered racial discrimination when the 
University of Texas rejected her application 
for admission. 
The case has broad implications for selective 
universities, almost all of which use race as 
an admissions factor to diversify their 
student bodies. In a 35-page brief filed 
today, the administration sought to make the 
issue one of national security, saying the 
military, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and Depatiment of Homeland Security all 
rely on universities to produce a steady 
stream of diverse graduates. 
"The United States has a critical interest in 
ensuring that educational institutions are 
able to provide the educational benefits of 
diversity," U.S. Solicitor General Donald 
Verrilli argued in a brief signed by officials 
in six federal departments, including the 
Pentagon. 
Bakke Case 
Universities have had the couti's blessing 
for affirmative action since the 1978 
Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke decision gave race-conscious 
admissions a limited endorsement. The court 
reaffirmed that ruling in 2003, saying in 
Grutter v. Bollinger that universities can 
consider race in admissions as long as they 
don't do so mechanistically. 
With five of the nine current justices openly 
skeptical about racial classifications, the 
2003 decision may now be in jeopardy. 
Today was the deadline for outside groups 
to file briefs supporting Texas in the case. 
Among those siding with the university was 
a group of 59 companies, including 
Microsoft Corp. (MSFT) and Wal-Mart 
Stores Inc. (WMT) 
The companies said they "must be able to 
hire highly trained employees of all races, 
religions, cultures and economIC 
backgrounds." 
Colin Powell, the former secretary of state 
and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
joined a group of retired military leaders 
who also urged the court to side with Texas. 
"Enormous Consequences" 
The rejected student, Abigail Noel Fisher, 
says the university is violating the 14th 
Amendment's equal protection clause. 
"If any state action should respect racial 
equality, it is university admission," Fisher's 
lawyers argued in a court filing in May. 
"Selecting those who will benefit from the 
limited places available at universities has 
enormous consequences for the future of 
American students and the perceived 
fairness of government action." 
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Texas uses a system that combines racial 
preferences with a rule that guarantees 
admission to state residents who graduate in 
the top 10 percent of their high school class. 
The so-called Top Ten Percent Law was 
designed in part to boost minority 
admissions at state universities. 
One issue for the Supreme Court will be 
whether the hybrid nature of Texas's 
approach undermines the rationale for race-
based admissions. A federal appeals court in 
New Orleans upheld the Texas system. 
Racial Role 
Fisher's lawyers point to statistics indicating 
that the Top Ten Percent Law, enacted in 
1997, was helping ensure a significant 
number of minority students even without 
explicit consideration of race. 
The state says it uses race in a more limited 
way than the University of Michigan Law 
School in the 2003 case. Texas says that, 
unlike Michigan, it doesn't track the racial 
composition of its entering class during the 
admissions process. Texas also says it 
doesn't have numerical goals for minority 
admissions. 
"The fact that race has only a modest and 
nuanced role in admissions decisions is not a 
constitutional problem," the university 
argued in court papers filed last week. "It is 
the hallmark of the type of plan this Court 
has held out as constitutional since Bakke. " 
The case will test the impact of the court's 
changed makeup, particularly the 2006 
retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 
who wrote the 2003 opinion, and the 
appointment of her successor, Justice 
Samuel Alito. 
Alito was in the majority in a 2007 decision 
that put new limits on public school 
integration efforts-and raised questions 
about the viability of other race-based 
government policies. 
The case, which the court probably will 
decide in the first half of 2013, is Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Allstin, 11- 345. 
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"The Next Big Affirmative-Action Case" 
The Chronicle of Higher Education 
January 27,2011 
Richard Kahlenberg 
Last week, a three-judge panel of the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a 
decision supporting a racial affirmative-
action program at the University of Texas. 
Today, a Nevil York Times editorial 
applauded the decision and concluded, "This 
ruling should give confidence to all 
universities about seeking diversity and 
merit." 
Far from glvmg confidence, however, the 
decision may well have set the stage for a 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling that will severely 
undercut, if not oveliurn, the 2003 Grlltter v. 
Bollinger decision affirming the use of race 
in admissions. 
In the Fifth Circuit case, Fisher v. Texas, 
white plaintiffs challenged the use of race in 
admissions, arguing that Texas's Top 10 
Percent plan-which automatically admits 
those in the top 10 percent of their high 
school class-creates sufficient racial 
diversity by itself. Plaintiffs noted that using 
race-blind criteria produced a class that was 
4.5 percent African-American and 16.9 
percent Hispanic in 2004, so the subsequent 
reintroduction of race on top of the Ten 
Percent plan is unconstitutional. (In Grlltter, 
a law-school class that ranged between 13.5 
and 20.1 percent minority was considered to 
have achieved a "critical mass" of such 
students.) 
On the surface, the three-judge Fifth Circuit 
panel decision was unanimously supportive 
of the University of Texas, but as Peter 
Schmidt noted in The Chronicle, "the judges 
were deeply divided in their reasoning." In 
particular, Judge Emilio Garza's opinion, 
though technically a "special concurrence," 
was highly critical of affirmative action, 
calling it unnecessary. He noted that in the 
2008 admissions cycle, of the 363 African 
American freshmen from Texas admitted 
and enrolled, 305 were the product of the 
Top Ten Percent plan, and just 58 were 
admitted through merit or a combination of 
merit and race. For in-state Hispanics, 1,322 
were admitted through the Top Ten Percent 
plan and just 158 through merit or a 
combination or merit and ethnicity. He 
concluded, "the University of Texas's use of 
race has had an infinitesimal impact on 
critical mass in the student body as a 
whole." The finding is impOliant because 
the Supreme Court used the minimal impact 
of race in K-12 integration plans in 
Louisville and Seattle to suggest the use of 
race was not really necessary. 
Judge Garza's opinion is replete with 
quotations from decisions by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, the new swing vote on 
the Supreme Court. Garza homed in on 
Kennedy's 2007 declaration that the 
individual classification of students by race 
should be used only as "a last resort." 
Kennedy notably dissented in Grlltter, 
saying the Court should "force educational 
institutions to seriously explore race-neutral 
alternatives. " 
Garza calls for the U.S. Supreme COUli to 
overturn Grlltter, but it seems more likely to 
me that while the conservatives (Justices 
Robelis, Thomas, Scalia, and Alito) might 
be willing to take that step, Justice Kennedy 
would be more comfortable gutting Gmtter, 
without overturning it, by vigorously 
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enforcing the decision's requirement to look 
to alternatives before using race. The 
practical implication would be for 
universities to earnestly employ class-based 
affirmative action and top-percent plans, 
reserving race for extreme cases. 
It is telling that the Center for Equal 
Opportunity's president, Roger Clegg, a 
strong opponent of affirmative action, said 
he saw the Fifth Circuit's Fisher decision as 
positive in several respects. The division 
within the panel invites a resolution from the 
Supreme Couti, he argued. The loss for the 
plaintiffs assures that the case will be 
appealed to the Supreme Court. (Had Texas 
lost, it might have declined to appeal for fear 
of setting a negative national precedent in 
the Supreme Couti.) And the Circuit Court 
decision came quickly, increasing the 
chances that the Supreme Court, in its 
current conservative makeup, will hear the 
case. 
All of this suggests that the survival of 
Grutter is in serious question. Those who 
care about diversity should begin their 
contingency planning now, exploring race-
neutral alternatives that will reach the sorts 
of economically disadvantaged populations 
that universities should have been pursuing 
all along. 
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"Asians and Affirmative Action" 
Inside Higher Ed 
March 30, 2012 
Scott Jaschik 
A brief filed Tuesday with the U.S. Supreme 
Court seeks to shake up the legal and 
political calculus of a case that could 
determine the constitutionality of programs 
in which colleges consider the race or 
ethnicity of applicants. In the brief, four 
Asian-American organizations call on the 
justices to bar all race-conscious admissions 
decisions, arguing that race-neutral policies 
are the only way for Asian-American 
applicants to get a fair shake. 
Much of the discussion of the case has 
focused on policies that help black and 
Latino applicants. And the suit that has 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court was filed 
on behalf of a white woman, Abigail Fisher, 
who was rejected by the University of Texas 
at Austin. 
But the new brief, along with one recently 
filed on behalf of Fisher, say that the policy 
at Texas and similar policies elsewhere hurt 
Asian-American applicants, not just white 
applicants. This view runs counter to the 
opinion of many Asian-American groups 
that have consistently backed affirmative 
action programs such as those in place at 
Texas. 
It is impossible to know how much weight 
the Asian-American issue will have with the 
justices. But the briefs have renewed a 
debate about who benefits-and who 
loses-from race-conscious admissions. 
While the briefs portray Asian Americans as 
victims of affirmative action, other Asian-
American groups are planning a brief 
backing affirmative action, and some experts 
on Asian-American educational trends 
caution that the new briefs have 
oversimplified a complicated issue, 
identifying the wrong culprit and ignoring 
the benefits some Asian Americans receive 
from affirmative action. Generally, those 
Asian-American leaders backing affirmative 
action stress the significant diversity among 
Asian-American students in the United 
States-including many recent immigrants 
who are not achieving instant academic 
success. 
The case before the Supreme COUli 
challenges the right of UT-Austin to 
consider race and ethnicity when it has been 
able to achieve some levels of diversity in 
the student body through a race-neutral 
means: the" I 0 percent" law that has assured 
all graduates in the top 10 percent of high 
schools in the state admission into any 
public university in the state. The university 
maintains that it should have the right to use 
other measures as well, and two lower courts 
have backed that position. Fisher's lawyers 
disagree. 
One test the Supreme Court has set for race-
conscious decisions by public entities is that 
such efforts must be "narrowly tailored," 
and the briefs focused on Asian-American 
applicants appear to suggest that the Texas 
program cannot meet that test in pati 
because the programs are (in the plaintiffs 
view) hurting some minority students to help 
others. 
The brief filed Tuesday on behalf of Asian-
American groups Tuesday focused less on 
the Texas admissions policy than on the 
consideration of race generally in college 
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admissions. "Admission to the nation's top 
universities and colleges is a zero-sum 
proposition. As aspiring applicants capable 
of graduating from these institutions 
outnumber available seats, the utilization of 
race as a 'plus factor' for some inexorably 
applies race as a 'minus factor' against those 
on the other side of the equation. 
Particularly hard-hit are Asian-American 
students, who demonstrate academic 
excellence at disproportionately high rates 
but often find the value of their work 
discounted on account of either their race, or 
nebulous criteria alluding to it," says the 
brief. 
It was filed on behalf of the 80-20 National 
Asian-American Educational Foundation, 
the National Federation of Indian American 
Associations, the Indian American Forum 
for Political Education, the Global 
Organization of People of Indian Origin and 
the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human 
Rights Under Law. (The latter group focuses 
on discrimination against Jewish Americans, 
and the brief argues that today's admissions 
policies have the same impact on Asian-
American applicants as prevIOUS 
generations' policies had on Jewish 
applicants.) 
The brief focuses heavily on research studies 
such as the work that produced the 2009 
book, No Longer Separate, Not Yet Eq1lal: 
Race and Class in Elite College Admission 
and Camp1ls Life (Princeton University 
Press), which argued that-when controlling 
for various factors--one could find the 
relative "advantage" in admissions of 
members of different ethnic and racial 
groups. 
The book suggested that private institutions 
essentially admit black students with SAT 
scores 310 points below those of comparable 
white students. And the book argued that 
Asian-American applicants need SAT scores 
140 points higher than those of white 
students to stand the same chances of 
admission. The brief also quotes from 
accounts of guidance counselors and others 
(including this account in Inside Higher Ed) 
talking about widely held beliefs in high 
schools with many Asian-American students 
that they must have higher academic 
credentials than all others to gain admission 
to elite institutions. 
The brief filed on behalf of Fisher does 
focus on Texas policies-and specifically 
their impact on Asian-American applicants. 
Texas has stated that it considers black and 
Latino students "under-represented" at the 
university, based in part on their proportions 
in the state population. And the Fisher brief 
considers that illegal. 
"UT's differing treatment of Asian 
Americans and other minorities based on 
each group's proportion of Texas's 
population illustrates why demographic 
balancing is constitutionally illegitimate ... 
. UT gives no admissions preference to 
Asian Americans even though 'the gross 
number of Hispanic students attending UT 
exceeds the gross number of Asian-
American students attending UT. ' This 
differing treatment of racial minorities based 
solely on demographics provides clear 
evidence that UT's conception of critical 
mass is not tethered to the 'educational 
benefits of a diverse student body.' UT has 
not (and indeed cannot) offer any coherent 
explanation for why fewer Asian Americans 
than Hispanics are needed to achieve the 
educational benefits of diversity." 
A footnote in the brief seeks to drive home 
the point: "Recognizing representational 
diversity as a compelling state interest might 
allow universities in racially homogenous 
states to employ race to the detriment of 
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qualified minority applicants in order to 
maintain a student body that mirrors the 
state population. Indeed, that is precisely the 
problem facing Asian-American students in 
Texas, as they are 'over-represented' 
demographically but highly qualified 
academically. " 
University of Texas officials are not giving 
interviews on the briefs. But an affidavit in 
the case from Kedra Ishop, currently 
director of admissions at UT -Austin and, at 
the time she gave the statement, associate 
director there, suggests that Texas may 
contest the idea that Asian-American 
applicants could not benefit from affirmative 
action at the university. 
In the statement, Ishop outlines factors that 
could be considered in admissions, listing 
them this way: "the socioeconomic status of 
the applicant's family and school, whether 
the applicant is from a single-parent home, 
whether languages other than English are 
spoken at the applicant's home, the 
applicant's family responsibilities and 
(starting with the fall class of 2005) the 
applicant's race." These criteria suggest that 
some Asian-American applicants could in 
fact receive some assistance on the 
university's approach to admissions. 
Debating the Asian-American Perspective 
Much of the reaction to the new brief 
focused on the wisdom of Asian-American 
groups taking a stand against the 
consideration of race. 
S.B. Woo, a retired professor of physics at 
the University of Delaware, and president of 
the 80-20 group, said he knew that 
Tuesday's action was a significant step. 
Nine years ago, when the U.S. Supreme 
Court last considered the issue of race in 
admissions, the group considered filing a 
brief, but opted not to do so. "We didn't 
know enough then to take a clear stand, but 
now we do," he said. 
In the years since, he said, it has become 
clear that consideration of race III 
admissions is not solving the nation's 
educational problems and "we now realize 
how much we have been discriminated 
against." 
Four other Asian-American groups-the 
Asian Pacific American Legal Center, the 
Asian American Justice Center, Asian 
American Institute and Asian Law Caucus-
filed a joint brief backing the University of 
Texas when the case was considered by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
And these groups are planning to file 
another brief with the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Woo said he realized that those groups had 
been speaking for Asian Americans 
generally in the affirmative action debate, 
but he said that students and families don't 
agree with them. He said he wasn't bothered 
that other Asian-American groups would be 
challenging his positions. "They will be, as 
we will be, accountable. Let's see how it 
will play out," he said. 
Several experts on Asian Americans in 
higher education agreed with Woo that 
many parents and families are frustrated by 
the college admissions process, and perceive 
it as hostile. But they questioned whether 
affirmative action programs really are 
responsible. 
Mitchell 1. Chang, professor of higher 
education, organizational change and Asian-
American studies at the University of 
California at Los Angeles, said that it is true 
that many Asian Americans "seem to be the 
ones who have the lowest chances, all things 
being equal, of getting into the most 
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selective institutions." Chang said that part 
of the problems is the "hypercompetitive" 
environment in selective college admissions. 
But to the extent that Asian-American 
applicants are being held to a higher 
standard, Chang said, that is primarily 
compared to white students, who aren't 
benefiting from affirmative action. "There is 
an issue we have to deal with: Why aren't 
Asian Americans with the same 
qualifications getting into the institutions at 
the same rate as white students? That's the 
question we have to address." 
He said briefs like those filed Tuesday will 
reinforce the sense that it is other minority 
students taking slots from Asian Americans, 
something Chang does not believe to be 
true. "But that sentiment is out there, and 
that's where [the brief filed Tuesday] is 
going to have a real impact." 
Robert Teranishi, associate professor of 
higher education at New York University 
and author of Asians in the Ivory Tower: 
Dilemmas of Racial Inequality in American 
Higher Education (Teachers College Press), 
said he believed Tuesday's brief was based 
on "a couple of false assumptions," one of 
them being that programs for black and 
Latino students should be a target. Teranishi 
asked, for example, why those concerned 
about the admission of Asian Americans to 
elite colleges-especially private 
institutions-were not focused more on 
preferences for alumni children. While so 
called "legacy admits" do include non-white 
applicants, such preferences 
overwhelmingly favor white people. 
Teranishi also said he was worried by a 
narrative that diversity effOlts help only 
black and Latino students, and that 
discussions of diversity should focus on elite 
institutions. He said that many non-elite 
institutions do quite a bit to recruit, admit 
and graduate Asian-American students who 
come from recent immigrant groups to the 
United States and who typically do not fare 
well in traditional admissions. Those 
programs are vital, he said, but could 
disappear if Texas loses at the Supreme 
Court. "I fear we are seeing Asian 
Americans used as a wedge group, which is 
really problematic, based on narrow 
interpretations of what affirmative action 
is. " 
Fmther, he said that he worries that the 
current focus will distract Asian-American 
leaders from emerging threats in higher 
education. For instance, he said that he 
worried that the current emphasis of many 
colleges to recruit many more international 
undergraduates (many of whom are from 
Asia) was creating a false sense that higher 
education has "too many Asians." While 
Teranishi said he was in no way opposed to 
international recruitment, he said he wanted 
to know how this emphasis on foreign 
students (who can pay their own way) was 
affecting other diversity efforts. 
Over all, he said, Asian Americans benefit 
not from attacking affirmative action, but 
from "broader inclusion." 
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Defending Race-Conscious Admissions" 
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The University of Texas at Austin is 
defending race-conscious admissions before 
the U.S. Supreme Court with arguments that 
explicitly seek to win over Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy, widely regarded as the court's 
swing vote on the issue. 
In a brief submitted to the court on Monday, 
the university focuses much of its energy on 
offering Justice Kennedy assurances that the 
policy is distinct from one he found 
troublesome when the Supreme Court last 
weighed in on such admission practices, in 
2003. 
More broadly, the university argues that its 
policy exemplifies the type that the Supreme 
Court approved in its previous decisions on 
affirmative action, and accuses those 
challenging its admission policy as 
unconstitutional of seeking to overturn 35 
years' worth of Supreme Court precedents 
dealing with colleges' consideration of the 
race or ethnicity of applicants. 
The brief argues that Abigail Noel Fisher, 
the rejected Texas applicant who filed the 
lawsuit now before the court, "really is just 
asking this court to move the goal posts on 
higher education in America." It argues that 
a Supreme Com1 decision to overrule, or 
effectively gut, past court decisions allowing 
race-conscious admissions "would 
jeopardize the nation's paramount interest in 
educating its future leaders in an 
environment that best prepares them for the 
society and work force they will encounter." 
In a videotaped announcement that the brief 
had been filed, William C. Powers Jr., the 
flagship campus's president, said, "We're 
confident that we'll prevail in this case, and 
that this will bring benefit to American 
higher education and to our nation and to the 
State of Texas." 
The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral 
arguments in the case, Fisher v. University 
of Texas at Allstin (No. 11-345), in October. 
One its more liberal members, Justice Elena 
Kagan, has recused herself, having been 
involved in her previous position as U.S. 
solicitor general in the Obama 
administration's submission of a brief 
supporting Texas when the case was before 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit. 
Of the court's eight remammg members, 
four-Chief Justice John G. Robel1s Jr. and 
Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr., Antonin Scalia, 
and Clarence Thomas-are regarded as so 
skeptical of race-conscious government 
policies they probably will seek to abandon 
the court's 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger 
decision, which declared that narrowly 
tailored race-conscious admission policies 
can serve a compelling government interest. 
Three others, Justices Stephen G. Breyer, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor, 
are seen as likely to fully suppol1 Texas. 
Justice Kennedy stands out as a swing vote 
because in the Grutter decision he accepted 
the idea that such policies provide 
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educational benefits that serve a government 
interest, but rejected the policy at issue, 
from the University of Michigan's law 
school. 
In the separate dissent he penned as part of 
the court's 5-4 Grutter ruling, Justice 
Kennedy argued that the Michigan law 
school gave too much weight to race for its 
policy to be considered narrowly tailored. 
He accused the law school of using race as 
"an automatic factor" in most admission 
decisions. Citing evidence that the law 
school's admissions officers consulted daily 
repOlis breaking down the racial 
composition of each incoming class, he 
argued that the school was using "numerical 
goals indistinguishable from quotas," which 
the Supreme Court had struck down in 1978 
ruling in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, involving a medical 
school. 
The brief that the University of Texas filed 
on Monday said its policy "lacks the 
features that Justice Kennedy found 
disqualifying in Gmtter: It is undisputed that 
UT has not established any race-based 
target; race is not assigned any automatic 
value; and the racial or ethnic composition 
of admits is not monitored during the 
admissions cycle." 
Texas's brief accuses Ms. Fisher's lawyers, 
who submitted their own brief to the court in 
May, of going back on factual concessions 
they had previously made in the case by 
freshly accusing Texas of trying to strike a 
particular racial balance in its enrollment. 
The university says that it considered the 
state's demographic breakdown only in 
considering whether black or Hispanic 
students were underrepresented on the 
Austin campus, and that the way its 
admission process is structured precludes 
any attempt to pass decisions on applications 
with race- or ethnicity-based enrollment 
targets in mind. 
In response to arguments by Ms. Fisher's 
lawyers that the court should consider 
overturning Grutter, the university argues 
that a court decision to change its stand after 
just nine years "would upset legitimate 
expectations in the rule of law," not to 
mention society'S interest in training 
America's future leaders in a diverse 
campus environment. The university accuses 
Ms. Fisher's lawyers of improperly raising 
an issue that had not been before the lower 
courts and was beyond the scope of its 
request that the Supreme COUli hear the 
case. 
Much of the university's brief is devoted to 
countering the other side's argument that the 
university had been achieving sufficient 
levels of diversity through a race-neutral 
means, a state law guaranteeing admission 
to any public university to young Texans in 
the top tenth of their high-school class. 
Such an argument, it says, "ignores the 
importance of diversity among individuals 
within racial groups" and the educational 
benefits of considering individual 
applicants' race to ensure that, for example, 
it can enroll minority students from 
relatively advantaged backgrounds who can 
help break down stereotypes. 
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